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DIAMOND IN THE ROUGH: MINING ARTICLE
36(1)(B) OF THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON
CONSULAR RELATIONS FOR AN INDIVIDUAL
RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS
BRITTANY P. WHITESELL
Thou shalt neither vex a stranger, nor oppress him: for ye were
1
strangers in the land of Egypt.

INTRODUCTION
The Vienna Convention on Consular Relations—a multilateral
treaty signed by the president and ratified by the Senate2—delineates
the rights of nations to conduct consular relations.3 Consular relations
are the means by which nations protect the interests of their citizenry
abroad, especially their nationals who are arrested for violating other
nations’ criminal laws.4 The right to assist citizens charged with crimes
abroad appears in Article 36 of the Vienna Convention. Article
36(1)(a) provides that countries may access and communicate with
their citizens,5 and Article 36(1)(b) provides that, upon detention,
foreign nationals must be informed that their consuls may assist
6
them. Foreign nationals have contended that the Article 36(1)(b)

Copyright © 2004 by Brittany P. Whitesell.
1. Exod. 22.21 (King James).
2. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77, 596 U.N.T.S.
261 [hereinafter Vienna Convention].
3. See generally id.
4. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, CONSULAR NOTIFICATION AND ACCESS: INSTRUCTIONS FOR
FEDERAL, STATE, AND LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT AND OTHER OFFICIALS REGARDING
FOREIGN NATIONALS IN THE UNITED STATES AND THE RIGHTS OF CONSULAR OFFICIALS TO
ASSIST THEM 42 (n.d.), available at http://travel.state.gov/pdf/CNA_book.pdf.
5. Article 36(1)(a) provides: “[C]onsular officers shall be free to communicate with
nationals of the sending State and to have access to them. Nationals of the sending State shall
have the same freedom with respect to communication with and access to consular officers of
the sending State.” Vienna Convention, supra note 2, art. 36(1)(a), 21 U.S.T. at 101, 596
U.N.T.S. at 292.
6. Article 36(1)(b) provides:
[I]f he so requests, the competent authorities of the receiving State shall, without
delay, inform the consular post of the sending State if, within its consular district, a
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language bestows upon them an individual right to consular
7
notification. Foreign nationals have generated voluminous litigation
in United States federal courts and international tribunals, invoking
Article 36(1)(b) to argue that their convictions should be overturned
because American law enforcement authorities never informed them
8
that they could receive assistance from their consuls.
These legal challenges turn on whether Article 36(1)(b), as a
treaty provision, confers rights upon individual foreign nationals or
only upon consuls. Beyond the “individual right” versus “consular
right” determination, the legal challenges also hinge on the scope of
the purported individual right. The Article 36(1)(b) right could be a
fundamental right that, if violated, would flaw convictions and
9
mandate their reversal. Alternatively, the Article 36(1)(b) right could

national of that State is arrested or committed to prison or to custody pending trial or
is detained in any other manner. Any communication addressed to the consular post
by the person arrested, in prison, custody or detention shall also be forwarded by the
said authorities without delay. The said authorities shall inform the person concerned
without delay of his rights under this subparagraph.
Id.
7. See infra notes 63–69, 75–96 and accompanying text.
8. See, e.g., Torres v. Mullin, 124 S. Ct. 562, 562 (2003) (refusing to hear a foreign
national’s claim that his death sentence should be overturned because of a Vienna Convention
violation); Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 373 (1998) (considering whether a foreign national’s
execution should be stayed because he had not been notified about the Vienna Convention);
United States v. Jimenez-Nava, 243 F.3d 192, 194–95 (5th Cir. 2001) (considering a foreign
national’s Vienna Convention claim); United States v. Emuegbunam, 268 F.3d 377, 385 (6th Cir.
2001) (same); United States v. Lombera-Camorlinga, 206 F.3d 882, 883 (9th Cir. 1999) (same);
United States v. Esparza-Ponce, 193 F.3d 1133, 1138–39 (9th Cir. 1999) (same); Standt v. City of
New York, 153 F. Supp. 2d 417, 422 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (same); United States v. Hongla-Yamche,
55 F. Supp. 2d 74, 75 (D. Mass. 1999) (same); United States v. Briscoe, 69 F. Supp. 2d 738, 740
(D.V.I. 1999) (same); LaGrand (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 466, 471–74 (June 27) (considering
Germany’s claim that its citizens’ rights under the Vienna Convention were violated); Memorial
of Mexico (Mex. v. U.S.), I.C.J. Pleadings (Avena and Other Mexican Nationals) 1 (June 20,
2003) [hereinafter Memorial of Mexico] (same), available at http://www.icjcij.org/icjwww/idocket/imus/imusframe.htm.
9. Some fundamental rights violations may not mandate automatic reversals of
convictions. Under American law, this remedy is unavailable when violations so insignificantly
impact cases that the convictions may stand consistently with the United States Constitution.
Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 22 (1967). The Constitution only requires automatic
reversals of convictions when the violations of fundamental rights harm the defendants. Id.
Defendants must show some prejudice—but presumably less prejudice than required when a
nonfundamental right is violated—to trigger automatic reversals of their convictions. See id.
This prejudice standard also applies indirectly in international law: when a country violates a
fundamental right, that country’s own standards of review and reconsideration supply the
remedy. See LaGrand, 2001 I.C.J. at 514 (“I]t would be incumbent upon the United States to
allow the review and reconsideration . . . by taking account of the violation of the rights set forth
in the Convention. This obligation can be carried out in various ways. The choice of means must
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be a nonfundamental right that, if violated, would mar convictions
only if the violations prejudiced the defendants. These inquiries into
whether Article 36 confers an individual right and, if so, whether the
10
right is fundamental are the focus of Article 36(1)(b) litigation.
These are also the focus of this Note. This Note argues that
Article 36(1)(b) does create an individual right that foreign nationals
11
may invoke to challenge their convictions, and this right may be
fundamental under domestic law. In other words, this Note maintains
that the right to consular notification is a strong candidate for
fundamental status and that violation of this right should prompt a
12
demanding substantive due process inquiry, which courts and
commentators have thus far been reluctant to conduct.
In suggesting that Article 36(1)(b) creates an individual right that
may be fundamental, the Note proceeds in three Parts. Part I
examines Article 36 jurisprudence from international tribunals and
the United States federal courts, highlighting disagreements about the
existence of an individual right in Article 36(1)(b) and agreement
about the nonfundamental nature of the purported individual right.
Part II undertakes a conventional treaty interpretation of Article
36(1)(b) to argue that the provision creates an individual right. Part
III considers the scope of this individual right, arguing that, under a
substantive due process analysis, the right to consular notification
should merit recognition as fundamental. Specifically, this Part
marshals evidence about the history of consular relations in the
United States to show that the right to consular notification could
survive on the history, tradition, and practice prong of the substantive
due process inquiry. Part III also presents alternative arguments that
litigants could make to demonstrate that the right to consular
notification is implicit in society’s modern conception of liberty.
I. ARTICLE 36(1)(B) JURISPRUDENCE
Article 36(1)(b) claims have been litigated in domestic and
international courts. Section A of this Part discusses interpretations of
Article 36(1)(b) by international tribunals, namely the International
Court of Justice (ICJ) and Inter-American Court of Human Rights
be left to the United States.”). Therefore, international law provides that the domestic
convictions of foreign-national defendants will be reversed only with a showing of prejudice.
10. See infra Part I.
11. See infra Part II.
12. See infra Part III.
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(IACHR). Section B discusses interpretations by United States
federal courts.
A. The Interpretation of Article 36 by International Tribunals
Nations whose citizens have been detained by other countries
without notification that they could contact their consulates for
assistance have brought Vienna Convention claims before
international tribunals, alleging violations of both their own right to
13
provide and their citizens’ right to receive consular assistance. These
claims succeeded on both counts: the ICJ and the IACHR found
violations of the nations’ and their citizens’ rights when the arresting
state failed to notify the detained foreign nationals that Article
36(1)(b) permitted them to seek aid from the consuls of their home
countries.14 By equating the failure to notify foreign nationals that
they could contact their consulates with a Vienna Convention
violation, the ICJ and the IACHR read Article 36(1)(b) to provide
detained foreign nationals an individual right to consular notification.
Both tribunals considered the contours of this individual right but
reached different conclusions.15 The ICJ twice refused to define the
16
scope of the individual right to consular notification, whereas the
IACHR opined that the right’s parameters were coterminous with the
parameters of the right to due process.17 This Section focuses first on
the ICJ’s interpretations of Article 36(1)(b) and then turns to the
interpretations of the IACHR.
1. The International Court of Justice. The ICJ, the “the principal
18
judicial organ of the United Nations,” has heard two cases raising

13. Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), para. 49 (Mar. 31, 2004)
[hereinafter Avena Judgment], available at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idecisions.htm;
LaGrand (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 466 (June 27); The Right to Information on Consular
Assistance in the Framework of the Guarantees of the Due Process of Law, Advisory Opinion
OC-16/99, Oct. 1, 1999, Inter-Am. C.H.R. (Ser. A) No. 16 (1999) [hereinafter Advisory
Opinion].
14. See infra notes 23–35, 37–44, 54–61.
15. See infra notes 54–58 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 37–47 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 54–58 and accompanying text.
18. U.N. Charter, art. 92; Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, art. 1,
59 Stat. 1055, 1060, http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/ibasicdocuments/Basetext/istatute.htm.
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19
Article 36(1)(b) claims. These claims were brought by states—
20
21
Germany and Mexico —because the ICJ does not have jurisdiction
22
to hear cases brought by individuals. Nonetheless, in deciding these
state-to-state disputes, the ICJ defined the rights of individuals:
because detained foreign nationals benefit from consular relations,
the ICJ’s interpetation of how consular relations should be conducted
under the treaty necessarily implicated a definition of foreign
nationals’ rights.
The ICJ considered whether Article 36(1)(b) confers an
individual right upon foreign nationals or merely a right upon nations
and their consuls in LaGrand.23 LaGrand involved two German
nationals charged with murder, convicted, and sentenced to death in
Arizona without ever being informed that they could contact the
German consulate, even though the arresting authorities knew their
nationality.24 In LaGrand, the ICJ held that foreign nationals possess
an individual right to information about the Vienna Convention’s
25
consular protections. The ICJ found this right in the express
language of Article 36(1)(b), which provides that “[t]he [law
enforcement] authorities shall inform the [foreign national] without
delay of his rights under this subparagraph.”26 By its language, Article
36(1)(b) requires countries that arrest foreign nationals to notify the
detainees about the possibility of receiving assistance from their
consulates.27 The right to notification and, by extension, the right to
obtain consular assistance rise to the level of individual rights,

19. Int’l Court of Justice, List of Cases Brought Before the Court Since 1946, at
http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idecisions.htm (last visited Jan. 9, 2005) (on file with the Duke
Law Journal).
20. LaGrand (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 466 (June 27).
21. Avena Judgment, supra note 13, at para. 49.
22. Int’l Court of Justice, General Information—The Court at a Glance, at http://www.icjcij.org/icjwww/igeneralinformation/icjgnnot.html (last visited Jan. 9, 2005) (on file with the
Duke Law Journal).
23. LaGrand (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 466 (June 27).
24. Memorial of Germany (F.R.G. v. U.S.), I.C.J. Pleadings (LaGrand) 9 (Sept. 16, 1999),
available at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/igus/igusframe.htm.
25. LaGrand, 2001 I.C.J. at 494 (“Article 36, paragraph 1, creates individual rights . . . .”).
26. Id. (quoting Vienna Convention, supra note 2, art. 36(1)(b), 21 U.S.T. at 101, 596
U.N.T.S. at 292).
27. The referenced subparagraph details countries’ rights to assist their nationals detained
abroad. See id. (“The said authorities shall inform the person concerned without delay of his
rights under this sub-paragraph.”).
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according to the ICJ, because the text of Article 36(1)(b) explicitly
28
defines the rights as such.
Furthermore, the ICJ found additional evidence in the text of
Article 36 confirming that Article 36 bestows an individual right on
foreign nationals.29 Under Article 36(1)(c), foreign nationals must
consent before their consulates can be notified about their arrests.30
Consequently, nations cannot exercise their rights to assist their
nationals arrested abroad unless their nationals give them permission
to do so.31 The ICJ deemed foreign nationals’ control over the
operation of Article 36 to corroborate the existence of an individual
32
right to consular notification.
Having concluded that “[t]he clarity of these provisions, viewed
in their context, admits of no doubt” that Article 36 grants an
33
individual right to foreign nationals, the ICJ did not define the
34
nature of this right —finding no need to define the right after
determining that the right existed and had been breached by the
35
United States. Consequently, the nature of the right that Article 36
confers upon foreign nationals remained undefined under
international law when the ICJ considered its next Vienna
Convention case, Avena and Other Mexican Nationals.36

28. See LaGrand, 2001 I.C.J. at 494. (“Significantly, this subparagraph ends with the
following language: ‘The said authorities shall inform the person concerned without delay of his
rights under this sub-paragraph.’” (quoting Vienna Convention, supra note 2, art. 36(1)(b), 21
U.S.T. at 101, 596 U.N.T.S. at 292)).
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. See id. (finding that Article 36(1)(c)’s consent proviso, in conjunction with the “his
rights” language in Article 36(1)(b), confers an individual right on foreign nationals).
33. Id.
34. See id.:
Germany further contended that the right of the individual to be informed without
delay under Article 36, paragraph 1, of the Vienna Convention was not only an
individual right but has today assumed the character of a human right . . . . The Court
having found that the United States violated the rights accorded by Article 36,
paragraph 1, to the LaGrand brothers, it does not appear necessary to it to consider
the additional argument developed by Germany in this regard.
35. Id. at 475–76, 494.
36. Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), para. 49 (Mar. 31, 2004), available
at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idecisions.htm.
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Defining the nature of this right was the primary issue presented
37
to the ICJ by Avena. In Avena, Mexico brought a claim against the
United States on behalf of fifty-four Mexican nationals sentenced to
38
death in the United States. All of the prisoners maintained that
American authorities had never informed them that they could
contact the Mexican consulate for assistance in their criminal
proceedings, and that their convictions were fatally flawed as a
result.39 Although LaGrand bound only Germany and the United
States in that particular case, and although the ICJ does not operate
40
on the principle of stare decisis, both Mexico and the United States
ascribed persuasive value to LaGrand in litigating Avena.41 Agreeing
that Article 36 confers an individual right, the parties clashed over
42
whether the right should be deemed a fundamental right, or even a
37. See Memorial of Mexico, supra note 8, at 126 (arguing that “The Deprivation of
Consular Notification and Assistance Renders Criminal Proceedings Fundamentally Unfair”);
Counter-Memorial of the United States (Mex. v. U.S.), I.C.J. Pleadings (Avena and Other
Mexican Nationals) 121 (Nov. 3, 2003) [hereinafter Counter-Memorial of the United States]
(arguing that the Vienna Convention “Does Not Compel State Parties to Treat Article 36(1) as
Creating Rights That Are Fundamental to Due Process”), available at http://www.icjcij.org/icjwww/idocket/imus/imusframe.htm.
38. Memorial of Mexico, supra note 8, at 1.
39. Id. at 38–39, 125.
40. See Int’l Court of Justice, A Guide to the History, Composition, Jurisdiction, Procedure
and Decisions of the Court: The Decision, at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/
igeneralinformation/ibbook/Bbookframepage.htm (last visited Oct. 25, 2004) (on file with the
Duke Law Journal) (“Since a decision of the Court affects the legal rights and interests solely of
the parties to the case and only in that particular case, it follows that the principle of stare decisis
(the binding nature of precedents) as it exists in Common Law countries has no place in
international law.”).
41. See Memorial of Mexico, supra note 8, at 93 (“Although the LaGrand judgment is
binding only between the United States and Germany, the Court’s holding with respect to the
‘obligations of the United States in cases of severe penalties imposed on [sic] German nationals’
who were not accorded their rights under Article 36 has clear relevance for Mexico, as well.”
(quoting LaGrand (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 466, 517 (June 27))); Counter-Memorial of the
United States, supra note 37, at 57 (“The LaGrand judgment sets forth the principles applicable
to the dispute presented to the Court.”).
42. A fundamental right under international law is a right that countries must afford
foreign nationals to comply with the minimum international standard—the international law
equivalent of due process. PETER MALANCZUK, AKEHURST’S MODERN INTRODUCTION TO
INTERNATIONAL LAW 256 (7th rev. ed. 1997). The minimum international standard requires
nations to treat foreign nationals within their territories in a civilized manner by adhering to
myriad legal rules. Id. at 256, 260. Because the legal rules have attained varying degrees of
acceptance from the international community, the content of the minimum international
standard is disputed. Id. at 261. In general, however, countries fall below the minimum
international standard by unlawfully violating foreign nationals’ physical integrity or by
subjecting them to “the maladministration of justice.” Id. Specifically, and most germane to this
Note, countries violate the minimum international standard by following judicial procedures
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43
44
human right, under international law. Even though Mexico’s
contentions directly presented to the ICJ the scope issue that the
court had avoided in LaGrand, the ICJ again skirted the issue of
whether “the right to consular notification . . . under the Vienna
Convention is a fundamental human right that constitutes part of due
process in criminal proceedings.”45 The ICJ maintained that the scope
of the Vienna Convention right “[was] not a matter that this Court
need[ed to] decide.”46 In dicta, however, the ICJ noted that the
travaux préparatoires, text, object, and purpose of the Vienna
Convention suggest that the Convention’s right to consular
notification is not fundamental to due process.47

2. The Inter-American Court on Human Rights. In an advisory
opinion, the IACHR also weighed in on the interpretation of Article
36(1)(b). The IACHR is a judicial organ created by the Organization
of American States (OAS) to implement the American Convention
on Human Rights,48 which created substantive human rights and
49
procedures for effectuating them. To implement the American
Convention, the IACHR was imbued with adjudicatory50 and
advisory jurisdiction.51 All members of the OAS,52 including the

that disadvantage foreign nationals. Id. Thus, the minimum international standard gives foreign
nationals a fundamental right to fair judicial proceedings. See id. (noting ways to violate the
minimum international standard through the “maladministration of justice”).
43. A human right under international law is a fluid and evolving concept; the term
encompasses civil, social, and political rights, as well as constitutional rights recognized by
Western democracies, such as the United States. Id. at 209–10. As a result, human right cannot
be precisely, or coherently, defined. Id. Instead, the prevailing definition is little more than the
statement of a theoretical ideal: human rights are inalienable and legally enforceable rights held
by individuals that protect them from state interference and governmental power abuses. Id.
at 209.
44. See Memorial of Mexico, supra note 8, at 124–46 (arguing that Article 36(1)(b) creates
a fundamental, or even a human, right under international law); Counter-Memorial of the
United States, supra note 37, at 121–40 (arguing that Article 36(1)(b) does not create a right
fundamental to due process under international law).
45. Avena Judgment, supra note 13, at para. 49.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, art. 33, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123, 153.
The United States, though a member of the OAS, is not a party to the Convention.
49. Id. arts. 3–25, 1144 U.N.T.S. at 145–51.
50. Id. arts. 61–63, 1144 U.N.T.S. at 159.
51. Id. art. 64, 1144 U.N.T.S. at 159–60.
52. Id. art. 64, 1144 U.N.T.S. at 160.
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53
United States, can seek advisory opinions about any treaty
implicating human rights. Mexico exercised this right in requesting
the IACHR to issue an advisory opinion on the Vienna Convention.
Mexico asked the IACHR specifically to consider whether
international conceptions of due process encompassed a right to
consular notification.
The IACHR was presented with the same facts that were before
the ICJ in Avena—fifty-four Mexican nationals were sentenced to
death in the United States and were never informed by the
authorities that they could seek assistance from the Mexican
54
55
consulate —but the IACHR reached a different conclusion. In
considering whether Article 36(1)(b) confers a fundamental right—a
question that the ICJ avoided56—the IACHR concluded that it does.57
The IACHR opined that consular notification enables foreign
nationals to defend themselves better in criminal proceedings and
that, because consular notification enhances their defenses, the right
to consular notification is implicit in due process under international
law.58
Although the United States correctly stated that no other
tribunal, domestic or international, had held that the right to
notification about consular assistance “must be recognized and
counted among the minimum guarantees essential to providing
foreign nationals the opportunity to adequately prepare their defense
59
and receive a fair trial,” the IACHR advisory opinion lends
credence to the argument that international due process requires
foreign nationals to receive notification about the Vienna
Convention.60 The opinion also reflected international sentiment
about the nature of the Article 36 individual right, given that seven

53. Charter of the Organization of American States, Apr. 30, 1948, 2 U.S.T. 2394, 2394, 119
U.N.T.S. 48, 48.
54. Advisory Opinion, supra note 13, para. 2.
55. See id. paras. 117, 122.
56. See id. para. 122 (defining the scope of the right to consular notification: classifying the
right “among the minimum guarantees essential to providing foreign nationals the opportunity
to adequately prepare their defense and receive a fair trial”).
57. See id. paras. 121–22 (asserting that due process under international law requires
consular notification because foreign-national defendants are at a disadvantage in alien criminal
justice systems).
58. Id.
59. Counter-Memorial of the United States, supra note 37, at 126–27.
60. See Memorial of Mexico, supra note 8, 124–45 (arguing that Article 36(1)(b) creates a
fundamental, or even a human, right).
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countries submitted amici curiae briefs urging the IACHR to accord a
61
foreign national’s Article 36(1)(b) right fundamental status.
B. The Interpretation of Article 36 by the United States Federal
Courts
Vienna Convention claims also have worked their way through
the United States federal courts. Criminal defendants have raised
Vienna Convention claims in district courts, in appeals to circuit
courts, and in petitions for writs of certiorari to the Supreme Court.
Although interpreting these claims in contradictory manners, courts
have consistently refused to grant criminal defendants relief on the
basis of Article 36(1)(b). This Section first details the Supreme
Court’s treatment of Article 36(1)(b) claims and then considers
relevant decisions of the lower federal courts.
1. The Supreme Court. In a federal habeas corpus case
antedating LaGrand,62 the United States Supreme Court
conspicuously left open the question of whether Article 36(1)(b)
creates an individual right under American law.63 In Breard v. Green,64
the Supreme Court, per curiam, denied a petition for certiorari from
Paraguay and Breard, a Paraguayan national awaiting execution in
Virginia.65 Because the Supreme Court denied the petition on
procedural grounds, the Court never reached the Vienna Convention
66
claims raised by Paraguay and Breard. The Court did state in
dictum, however, that “[t]he Vienna Convention . . . arguably confers
67
on an individual the right to consular assistance following arrest.”
Although the Supreme Court did not definitively recognize that
foreign nationals possess individual rights to consular notification, the
Court’s statement indicated its inclination to do so when presented
with a case requiring the resolution of the issue.
The Supreme Court, however, denied itself the opportunity to
act on this inclination by denying certiorari in a case brought by a

61. Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and
Paraguay submitted amici curiae briefs. Advisory Opinion, supra note 13, para. 26.
62. See supra notes 23–35 and accompanying text.
63. United States v. Emuegbunam, 268 F.3d 377, 390 (6th Cir. 2001).
64. 523 U.S. 371 (1998).
65. Id. at 378–79.
66. Id. at 375.
67. Id. at 376.
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Mexican national convicted of murder in the United States without
notification that the Vienna Convention made consular assistance
68
available to him. In its Fall 2003 term, the Court refused to hear the
Vienna Convention claim of Osbaldo Torres, one of the fifty-four
Mexican nationals involved in the Avena case, because he had not
raised his Vienna Convention claim in the trial court.69 Thus, the
procedural default rule, which holds that defendants waive and

68. See Torres v. Mullin, 124 S. Ct. 562, 562 (2003) (refusing to hear a foreign national’s
claim that his death sentence should be overturned because of a Vienna Convention violation).
Although the Court avoided rendering its own interpretation of Article 36(1)(b), the Court
granted certiorari in Medellin v. Dretke to decide whether to adhere to the ICJ’s interpretations
of the provision. 321 F.3d 270 (5th Cir. 2004), cert. granted, 125 S. Ct. 686 (Dec. 10, 2004) (No.
04-5928). In the Spring of 2005, the Court may decide whether to import the ICJ’s
interpretations of Article 36(1)(b) by determining the effect on domestic law of the ICJ
judgments in LaGrand and Avena. See Medellin v. Dretke, 321 F.3d 270 (5th Cir. 2004), petition
for cert. filed, 2004 WL 2851246 (Aug. 18, 2004) (No. 04-5928) (presenting questions about
whether the ICJ judgments should be treated as rules of decision or recognized under principles
of comity and uniform treaty interpretation). Giving domestic effect to the ICJ’s interpretations
of Article 36(1)(b) would equate to the domestic recognition of an individual right to consular
notification. See Avena Judgment, supra note 13, at para. 49 (recognizing an individual right
under Article 36(1)(b)); LaGrand (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 466, 494 (June 27) (same). But
the scope of the Article 36(1)(b) right will remain undefined because the ICJ failed to classify
the right to consular notification as fundamental or nonfundamental under international law. Id.
Furthermore, even if LaGrand or Avena had pronounced the scope of the right to consular
notification under international law, the ICJ’s taxonomy would not determine the right’s scope
under domestic law. Fundamental status under international law, although suggestive of the
right’s importance to society, does not activate domestic constitutional protections. See infra
Part III. Therefore, the scope of the Article 36(1)(b) right in domestic law will await definition
even if the Court gives domestic effect to the ICJ judgments in Medellin. 321 F.3d 270 (5th Cir.
2004), cert. granted, 125 S. Ct. 686 (Dec. 10, 2004) (No. 04-5928).
The prospect that Medellin will lead to the importation of international law created a
domestic furor. In response to the grant of certiorari, President Bush withdrew the United
States from the Optional Protocol that commits all disputes arising under the Vienna
Convention to the compulsory juridiction of the ICJ. Adam Liptak, U.S. Says It Has Withdrawn
From World Judicial Body, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 2005, at A16. As a result, the United States
can no longer sue or be sued for Vienna Convention violations in the ICJ although the United
States remains a party to the treaty. Id. The withdrawal from the Optional Protocol effectively
prevents future cases like Avena and restricts foreign nationals whose Article 36(1)(b) rights
were violated by the United States to domestic fora.
In addition to withdrawing the United States from the Optional Protocol, President Bush
issued an unprecedented memorandum instructing state courts to conduct the review and
reconsideration required by the Avena judgment. Id. If the states follow President Bush’s order,
the fifty-one Mexican nationals who were entitled to review and reconsideration under the ICJ
judgment will receive new hearings to determine whether Vienna Convention violations led to
their convictions.
69. Id.; Application Instituting Proceedings (Mex. v. U.S.), I.C.J. Pleadings (Avena and
Other Mexican Nationals) 39 (Jan. 9, 2003), available at http://www.icjcij.org/icjwww/idocket/imus/imusorder/imus_iapplication_20030109.PDF.
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cannot raise on appeal any legal claims that they failed to raise in the
trial court, provided the Court with an excuse for avoiding the Article
70
36(1)(b) issue.
Given that the Court has not yet recognized an individual right
under Article 36(1)(b), it certainly has not pronounced the scope of
such a right. The Breard Court did not intimate whether it would
categorize the right that it indirectly acknowledged as fundamental or
71
nonfundamental under domestic law. The Court did imply that the
harmless error doctrine would apply to properly raised Vienna
Convention claims72—that is, a court could reverse convictions for
failure to inform foreign nationals of their right to consular assistance
only if the nationals proved that such failure had contributed to their
convictions.73 This intimation, however, did not at all suggest the

70.

See Breard, 523 U.S. at 375–76:
By not asserting his Vienna Convention claim in state court, [the defendant] failed
to exercise his rights under the Vienna Convention in conformity with the laws of
the United States and the Commonwealth of Virginia. Having failed to do so, he
cannot raise a claim of violation of those rights now on federal habeas review.
Given the procedural default rule, the determination of whether Article 36(1)(b) confers
an individual right may be distant: foreign nationals not informed about the Vienna Convention
are unlikely to have sufficient knowledge to raise a Vienna Convention claim at trial and litigate
it through the courts, which will permit the Supreme Court to use the procedural default rule to
avoid deciding whether the Convention confers an individual right to consular notification. If
the Supreme Court relies on the procedural default rule to avoid considering the issue on the
merits, the Court will contravene Article 36(2) of the Vienna Convention, supra note 2, 596
U.N.T.S. at 292–94, and the ICJ’s judgments in LaGrand and Avena. Avena and Other
Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. at para. 49; LaGrand (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J.
466 (June 27). Article 36(2) prohibits a state from applying its domestic law in a manner that
denies full effect to the rights provided by the treaty, Vienna Convention, supra note 2, 596
U.N.T.S. at 292–94, and the ICJ held in LaGrand that application of the procedural default rule
violates Article 36(2). See 2001 I.C.J. at 497 (holding that the application of the procedural
default rule to the specific facts violated Article 36(2)). Based on this breach, the ICJ held in
Avena that the procedural default rule cannot bar review and reconsideration of convictions
obtained in violation of the right to consular notification. 2004 I.C.J. at 51–52. Whether the
Court will adhere to the ICJ’s judgments or follow domestic precedents that require application
of the procedural default rule should be determined when the Court decides the effect of ICJ
judgments on domestic law in Medellin v. Dretke. 321 F.3d 270 (5th Cir. 2004), cert. granted, 125
S. Ct. 686 (Dec. 10, 2004) (No. 04-5928).
71. See Breard, 523 U.S. at 376 (acknowledging that the treaty may confer an individual
right but failing to delineate the right’s parameters).
72. See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 22 (1967) (“[T]here may be some
constitutional errors which in the setting of a particular case are so unimportant and
insignificant that they may, consistent with the Federal Constitution, be deemed harmless, not
requiring the automatic reversal of the conviction.”).
73. See Breard, 523 U.S. at 377 (“Even were Breard’s Vienna Convention claim properly
raised and proved, it is extremely doubtful that the violation should result in the overturning of
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parameters of a right to consular notification: the harmless error
doctrine can apply regardless of whether rights are fundamental or
74
nonfundamental.
2. The Lower Federal Courts. Left without guidance from the
Supreme Court about how to interpret the Vienna Convention, the
lower federal courts have diverged on the meaning of Article 36.
Some courts have interpreted the provision to create only consular
75
rights, whereas others have held that it creates individual rights. Part
A of this section discusses cases that typify the position that Article
36(1)(b) does not create an individual right, whereas Part B discusses
cases that typify the position that an individual right is created.
Despite this split, the courts uniformly agree that such a right, if it
does indeed exist, is not fundamental.76
a. The Vienna Convention Does Not Confer an Individual Right.
The interpretation of Article 36(1)(b) that denies the existence of an
77
individual right is typified by United States v. Jimenez-Nava —an
appeal brought by a Mexican national who was convicted of
possessing counterfeit immigration documents.78 Reasoning from
principles of treaty law and interpretation, the Fifth Circuit held that
the Vienna Convention bestows rights to conduct consular relations
only on nations.79 The court explained that, because treaties must be
interpreted consistently across the domestic laws of their signatories,
international law presumes that treaties do not create individual

a final judgment of conviction without some showing that the violation had an effect on the
trial.”).
74. Id. at 377.
75. Compare United States v. Emuegbunam, 268 F.3d 377, 394 (6th Cir. 2001) (holding that
Article 36(1)(b) does not confer an individual right), with United States v. Hongla-Yamche, 55
F. Supp. 2d 74, 78 (D. Mass. 1999) (holding that Article 36(1)(b) does confer an individual
right). Additionally, a third group of federal courts refuses to address the individual right issue
directly; instead, they assume that Article 36(1)(b) creates an individual right only as an
intermediate step in deciding Vienna Convention cases on harmless error grounds. See, e.g.,
United States v. Salameh, 54 F. Supp. 2d 236, 279 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (assuming that Article
36(1)(b) creates an individual right for the purpose of reaching a decision on the merits, and
citing cases).
76. See, e.g., United States v. De La Pava, 268 F.3d 157, 165 (2d Cir. 2001) (joining three
other courts of appeals in disqualifying consular notification as a fundamental right).
77. 243 F.3d 192 (5th Cir. 2001).
78. Id. at 193.
79. Id. at 198.
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80
rights. The Fifth Circuit looked to the plain language of the Vienna
Convention for indications that Article 36(1)(b) was drafted to rebut
81
this presumption by creating an individual right. According to the
Fifth Circuit, the express language of the Convention’s preamble—
which states that the treaty “is not to benefit individuals”—barred any
rebuttal of the presumption against finding the existence of individual
rights.82 Based on this language and because the treaty’s purpose does
not directly correspond to an individual right, the Fifth Circuit
83
concluded that Article 36(1)(b) confers no individual right. The
court reached this decision notwithstanding evidence that “the State
Department’s manual on the treatment of foreign nationals advises
arresting officers to inform detainees of their right to consular
communication.”84 Although recognizing that “[t]he State
Department’s view of treaty interpretation is entitled to substantial
85
deference,” the court regarded the State Department manual’s
suggestion that arresting officers should inform detainees of their
right to consular notification as an expression of “laudable
determination to abide by the [Vienna Convention],” not as an
acknowledgement that individuals may enforce the treaty in court.86

b. The Vienna Convention Does Confer an Individual Right.
The opposite conclusion was reached by the United States District
Court for the Southern District of New York when it considered
87
Standt v. City of New York. Standt involved a section 1983 suit
brought against police officers by a German national arrested for
driving while intoxicated and without a driver’s license.88 The German
national’s claim was premised on the Vienna Convention because the
80. See id. at 195 (“Treaty construction is a particularly sensitive business because
international agreements should be consistently interpreted among the signatories. . . .
[Consequently,] they do not generally create rights that are enforceable [by individuals] in the
courts.”).
81. See id. at 196–97 (examining the language of the preamble and Article 36).
82. See id. at 196 (“This language would appear to preclude any possibility that individuals
may benefit from [the Vienna Convention] when they travel abroad . . . .”).
83. See id. at 196–97 (reasoning that the plain language of Article 36 and the purpose of the
Vienna Convention—establishing consular rights—indicate that Article 36 does not confer an
individual right).
84. See id. at 198 (“[T]he implementation of the treaty by the federal government is wholly
different from the implication that it may be enforced in court by individual detainees.”).
85. See id. at 197 (citing United States v. Li, 206 F.3d 56, 63–66 (1st Cir. 2000)).
86. Id. at 198.
87. 153 F. Supp. 2d 417 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
88. Id. at 419–21.
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police never informed him that he could contact the German
89
consulate. The district court’s decision in this case is representative
of the judgments recognizing an individual right under Article
90
36(1)(b).
Reviewing the plain language of the Vienna Convention, the
district court expressed that it was “difficult to imagine ‘. . . language
that more unequivocally establishe[d] that the protections of Article
36(1)(b) belong to the individual national, and that the failure to
promptly notify him/her of these rights constitutes a violation of these
91
entitlements by the detaining authority.’” Like the ICJ in LaGrand,
the district court based its conclusion on the reference to “his rights”
92
in Article 36(1)(b). Continuing its plain language interpretation, the
district court dismissed the section of the preamble that the Fifth
Circuit found dispositive in Jimenez-Nava. The district court
concluded that the preamble merely clarified that the Convention’s
consular relations rights belonged to states rather than their
individual consular officers and that this clarification had no effect on
individual foreign nationals’ rights under the treaty.93 The treaty’s
drafting history and its application since ratification confirmed the
district court’s conclusion that the Vienna Convention confers an
individual right to consular notification:94 the treaty’s drafters had
been immensely concerned about individual rights95 and, since
ratification, the United States and other nations had recognized an
96
individual right in practice.

89. Id. at 421.
90. E.g., United States v. Hongla-Yamche, 55 F. Supp. 2d 74, 78 (D. Mass. 1999).
91. Standt, 153 F. Supp. 2d at 425 (quoting United States v. Li, 206 F.3d 56, 72 (1st Cir.
2000)).
92. See id. (“This ‘text emphasizes that the right of consular notice . . . is the citizen’s.’”
(quoting Breard v. Pruett, 134 F.3d 615, 622 (4th Cir. 1998), cert. denied sub nom. Breard v.
Green, 523 U.S. 371 (1998))).
93. See id. (“[W]hen taken in the context of the treaty as a whole, the Preamble’s reference
to ‘individuals’ is best understood as referring to consular officials rather than civilian foreign
nationals.”).
94. See id. at 425 (“[The travaux préparatoires and the treaty’s operation in practice]
affirm[] the interpretation that the [Vienna Convention] was intended to confer individual
rights.”).
95. See id. at 425–26 (“[C]ommittee and plenary meeting debates on the [Vienna
Convention] reflect widespread concern with the question of individual rights.”).
96. See id. at 426–27 (providing examples of other nations’ interpretations of the Vienna
Convention and explaining compliance procedures established in the United States).
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c. The Vienna Convention Does Not Confer a Fundamental
Right: Some Agreement among the Federal Courts. Despite the
disagreement about whether Article 36 confers an individual right,
the federal courts concur about the scope of the right if it does exist.
They agree that the right is equivalent to a right created by federal
97
statute, which means that the right is not a fundamental right. The
Fourth Circuit explained that, even if Article 36 confers an individual
right, it is not a constitutional right:
[E]ven if the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations could be
said to create individual rights (as opposed to setting out the rights
and obligations of signatory nations), it certainly does not create
constitutional rights. Although states may have an obligation under
the Supremacy Clause to comply with the provisions of the Vienna
Convention, the Supremacy Clause does not convert violations of
treaty provisions (regardless whether those provisions can be said to
create individual rights) into violations of constitutional rights. Just
as a state does not violate a constitutional right merely by violating a
federal statute, it does not violate a constitutional right merely by
98
violating a treaty.

This statement reflects the weight of authority in American law about
the nature of the Article 36(1)(b) right. The federal courts maintain
that, although the ratification of the Vienna Convention imported
Article 36(1)(b) into the supreme law of the United States, the right
to consular communication does not achieve constitutional status.
II. AN INDIVIDUAL RIGHT
Federal courts have interpreted Article 36(1)(b) contradictorily.
Some courts have concluded that this provision gives detained foreign
nationals a right to notification that they can contact their consuls for
assistance,99 whereas other courts have determined that the treaty
only gives consuls a right to assist their detained foreign nationals.100
These inconsistent interpretations stem from the nature of the
document being interpreted. Treaties are contracts among national
governments enforceable against the governments through political

97. See Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314 (1829) (“Our constitution declares a
treaty . . . . to be regarded in courts of justice as equivalent to an act of the legislature . . . .”).
98. Murphy v. Netherland, 116 F.3d 97, 100 (4th Cir. 1997).
99. See supra notes 91–94 and accompanying text.
100. See supra notes 77–86 and accompanying text.
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101
and diplomatic channels. As such, treaties generally do not grant
102
rights to individuals. Self-executing treaties, however, are an
103
exception to this general rule. Self-executing treaties, which do not
require Congress to pass additional legislation for implementation
and go into force immediately upon ratification, may confer
individual rights.104 The Vienna Convention is indisputably a selfexecuting treaty,105 and it may fit into the individual right exception.
To determine whether the Vienna Convention falls into the
individual right exception, this Part interprets Article 36(1)(b)
according to canons of treaty interpretation. Section A examines the
plain language of Article 36(1)(b), which is the first step in all treaty
106
interpretation. Although the plain language of Article 36(1)(b)
seemingly provides a definitive meaning, Section B proceeds to the
next step in treaty interpretation and explores the Vienna
Convention’s travaux préparatoires—the treaty equivalent of
legislative history.107 Finally, Section C completes the interpretive
analysis by considering how the United States and other countries
have implemented the Vienna Convention. Evidence is adduced that,
along with the recognition that a self-executing treaty may create
individual rights, strongly suggests that Article 36(1)(b) confers an
individual right to consular notification. This analysis of the Vienna
Convention’s plain language, legislative history, and practical
implementation—together with the recognition that a self-executing
treaty may create individual rights—strongly suggests that Article
36(1)(b) confers an individual right to consular notification.

101. See United States v. Jimenez-Nava, 243 F.3d 192, 195 (5th Cir. 2001) (characterizing
treaties as contracts enforced by the nations that are parties to them).
102. See, e.g., United States v. Gengler, 510 F.2d 62, 67 (2d Cir. 1975) (“[E]ven where a
treaty provides certain benefits for nationals of a particular state[,] . . . it is traditionally held
that any rights arising out of such provisions are, under international law, those of the states
and . . . individual rights are only derivative through the states.”).
103. Erik G. Luna & Douglas J. Sylvester, Beyond Breard, 17 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 147,
155 (1999).
104. Id.
105. Vienna Convention, supra note 2, 21 U.S.T. at 185, 596 U.N.T.S. at 376 (proclaiming
entry into force on December 24, 1969); Torres v. Mullin, 124 S. Ct. 562, 564 (2004) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting); Hearing Before the Senate Comm. On Foreign Rel., S. Exec. Rep. No. 90–9, 91st
Cong. at 5.
106. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature May 23, 1969, art.
31(1), 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 341.
107. See id. art. 32, 1155 U.N.T.S. at 340 (explaining the circumstances under which it is
appropriate to consider the travaux préparatoires).
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A. Plain Language
The Vienna Convention’s plain language indicates that an
individual right exists under Article 36(1)(b). This provision contains
108
a reference to “his rights,” which appears nowhere else in the treaty.
The use of this special language signals that the purpose of this
provision differs from that of the rest of the treaty. The conspicuous
addition of this language belies the argument that Article 36(1)(b)
only effectuates a consulate’s right to assist its foreign national. The
rights of the consul could have been provided for in the treaty without
using the “his rights” language.109 The standard “consular post,”110
111
112
“sending state,” and “receiving state” language that appears in
Article 36(1)(b) would have sufficed. The addition of the “his rights”
language, in the context of the entire treaty and by its own terms, is
strong evidence that Article 36(1)(b) creates an individual right.113
The “his rights” language of Article 36(1)(b) is not necessarily
undone by the Vienna Convention’s preamble in the way that the
114
Fifth Circuit maintained. The preamble states that the purpose of
such privileges and immunities is not to benefit individuals but to
ensure the efficient performance of functions by consular posts on
behalf of their respective States.115 Instead of indicating that the
Vienna Convention does not give foreign nationals an individual
right, this language likely means that the “privileges and immunities”
bestowed on consular officers are the means of effecting consular
responsibilities, not mere personal benefits.116 This caveat is necessary
to justify the Vienna Convention’s tax exemptions and special

108. Vienna Convention, supra note 2, art. 36(1)(b), 21 U.S.T. at 101, 596 U.N.T.S. at 292.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. See supra notes 26, 92 and accompanying text.
114. Vienna Convention, supra note 2, pmbl., 21 U.S.T. at 79, 596 U.N.T.S. at 262; see supra
notes 77–86 and accompanying text.
115. Vienna Convention, supra note 2, pmbl., 21 U.S.T. at 79, 596 U.N.T.S. at 262.
116. See United States v. Rodrigues, 68 F. Supp. 2d 178, 182 (1999) (“[I]t appears that the
purpose of [the preamble] is not to restrict the individual notification rights of foreign nationals,
but to make clear that the Convention’s purpose is to ensure the smooth functioning of consular
posts in general, not to provide special treatment for individual consular officials.”); see also
Emily Deck Harrill, Note, Exorcising the Ghost: Finding a Right and a Remedy in Article 36 of
the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, 55 S.C. L. REV. 569, 578 (2004) (“The preamble,
viewed in context, simply recognizes that consuls are not afforded the immunities outlined in
the treaty as personal benefits.”).
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117
protections for consular officers. Nothing in the treaty’s plain
language indicates that the preamble’s reference to individuals is not
intended to encompass foreign nationals detained abroad. In fact, the
actual operation of the Vienna Convention suggests otherwise.
Benefits to individual foreign nationals are necessary byproducts of
consular relations; when a country negotiates visa rights for its
citizens or visits a national in jail, these individuals will necessarily
derive benefits from the conduct of consular relations.118
Consequently, the preamble to the Vienna Convention cannot
logically be interpreted to deny benefits to foreign nationals.
Irrespective of the “no individual benefit” language in the preamble,
Article 36(1)(b) likely confers an individual right.

B. Drafting
The Vienna Convention’s travaux préparatoires underpin Article
36(1)(b)’s plain language.119 The records of the International Law
120
121
Commission and the Vienna Conference show that the treaty’s
drafters sought to draft a provision that would “adequately
safeguard[] individual freedom and the exercise of consular
functions.”122 The Vienna Conference delegates adopted the final
version of Article 36(1)(b) believing that “the right given to

117. See, e.g., Vienna Convention, supra note 2, art. 32, 21 U.S.T. at 98, 596 U.N.T.S. at 288
(taxation); id. art. 31, 21 U.S.T. at 97, 596 U.N.T.S. at 288 (inviolability of consular premises).
118. See, e.g., id. art. 5(d), 21 U.S.T. at 83, 596 U.N.T.S. at 268 (explaining the consular
function of issuing visas); id. art. 36(1)(c), 21 U.S.T. at 101, 596 U.N.T.S. at 292 (“[C]onsular
officers shall have the right to visit a national . . . who is in prison, custody or detention . . . .”).
119. See Summary Records of the 13th Session, [1961] 1 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 33, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/SER.A/1961 (“The consul’s freedom to communicate with his nationals, and their right
to communicate with their consul, constituted the cornerstone of the whole structure of consular
relations.”).
120. The Internal Law Commission—thirty-four international lawyers elected by the United
Nations General Assembly as representatives of the world’s principal legal systems—codifies
customary international law and promotes its progressive development. MALANCZUK, supra
note 42, at 61. The Commission drafts treaties and prepares reports that summarize
international law. Id.
121. The Vienna Conference convened in March 1963 pursuant to United Nations General
Assembly Resolution 1685. G.A. Res. 1685, U.N. GAOR, 16th Sess., Supp. No. 9, at 61–62,
U.N. Doc. A/4843 (1961). The Secretary-General convoked the Conference of plenipotentiaries
to consider the articles on consular relations drafted by the International Law Commission and
to adopt a consular convention based upon them. Id. The Vienna Convention resulted. See
supra note 2 and accompanying text.
122. 1 United Nations Conference on Consular Relations: Official Records, at 82, U.N. Doc.
A/Conf. 25/16, U.N. Sales. No. 63.X.2 (1963) [hereinafter Official Records].
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123
The
consulates implied a corresponding right for nationals.”
proponents of Article 36(1)(b) drafted the “his rights” language to
124
establish consular notification as an individual right. The passage of
the provision indicates that a majority of delegates either sought to
confer an individual right or at least acquiesced to doing so. The
travaux préparatoires demonstrate that one of the reasons for
adopting Article 36 in its present form was to give foreign nationals
an individual right to consular notification. This is compelling
evidence that the courts should recognize an individual right.
The debates preceding the adoption of another provision—
Article 36(1)(c)—also suggest that the drafters of the Vienna
Convention wanted to provide an individual right. The drafters
debated whether Article 36(1)(c) would require notification of
consuls automatically upon the arrest of foreign nationals or only
125
upon a detainee’s request. Notably, the American delegate opposed
an automatic notification provision because such a provision “[would]
126
not recognize the freedom of action of the detained person.”
Because “[t]he object . . . was to protect the rights of the national
concerned,”127 the delegates ultimately chose to draft a discretionary
128
Article 36(1)(c). Under the provision, an arresting state must notify
a detained foreign national’s consul only if the foreign national
requests notification. Concomitant with the right to notification is the
right to know that consular assistance is available: foreign nationals
can exercise their right to ask arresting states to contact their
consulates only if they are aware of this right.129 It follows that the

123.
124.

Id. at 333.
See id. at 83–84:
The language of the [first-mentioned proposal] was unacceptable as it stood,
because it could give rise to abuses and misunderstanding. It could well make the
provisions of article 36 ineffective because the person arrested might not be aware
of his rights. . . . For those reasons . . . it was essential to introduce a provision to
the effect that the authorities of the receiving State should inform the person
concerned without delay of his rights . . . .
125. Id. at 337 (debating between “[t]he absolute and unconditional obligation of the
authorities of the receiving State to notify the sending State’s consul if a national of that State
was . . . detained” and “the idea . . . that consuls should be notified only when the person
concerned so requested”).
126. Id. at 38.
127. Id. at 337.
128. Vienna Convention, supra note 2, art. 36(1)(c), 21 U.S.T. at 101, 596 U.N.T.S. at 292.
129. See Official Records, supra note 122, at 84 (“[I]t was essential to introduce a provision
to the effect that the authorities of the receiving State should inform the person concerned
without delay of his rights . . . .”).
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drafters’ adoption of Article 36(1)(c) conferred upon foreign
nationals the right to learn from arresting states that they may ask for
130
their consuls’ aid. Therefore, the history of Article 36(1)(c), when
taken together with that of Article 36(1)(b), strongly indicates that
foreign nationals hold an individual right to learn from arresting
states that they may contact their consuls for assistance.
C. Practice
Nations’ implementation of Article 36(1)(b) further supports the
conclusion that Article 36(1)(b) confers an individual right. In
practice, the United States has never denied that foreign nationals
possess an individual right under Article 36(1)(b).131 The State
Department acknowledges the foreign national’s “right to have his
132
consular officials notified of his arrest or detention.” The State
Department incorporates this right into its domestic policy,
undertaking efforts to insure that it “advise[s] the foreign national of
this right of his.”133 These efforts include federal regulations134 and
official missives to the states.135 These domestic initiatives cannot be
dismissed as mere efforts to comply with the treaty because the
position taken by a federal agency charged with effectuating a given
right is owed special deference.136 Furthermore, the State
Department’s domestic policy counters its opposition to challenges
brought by foreign nationals under Article 36(1)(b) because “the
litigation position of the State Department may not be entitled to as
great weight as its nonlitigation policy approach to interpreting the
[Vienna Convention].”137 Thus, the State Department’s domestic

130. Id.
131. See Standt v. City of New York, 153 F. Supp. 2d 417, 426 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (discussing
the State Department’s efforts to comply with the Vienna Convention).
132. William H. Taft IV, U.S. Dep’t of State Legal Advisor, Remarks to the National
Association of Attorneys General (Mar. 20, 2003) (emphasis added), available at
http://usinfo.org/wf-archive/2003/030321/epf516.htm.
133. Id. (emphasis added).
134. Notification of Consular Officers upon the Arrest of Foreign Nationals, 28 C.F.R. § 50.5
(2005); Apprehension, custody, and detention, 8 C.F.R. § 236.1(e) (2005).
135. See generally U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, supra note 4 (“This booklet contains instructions
and guidance relating to the arrest and detention of foreign nationals. . . . The instructions and
guidance herein should be followed by all . . . state[] and local government officials, whether law
enforcement, judicial, or other.”).
136. United States v. Li, 206 F.3d 56, 63–66 (1st Cir. 2000).
137. See Standt, 153 F. Supp. 2d at 427 n.6 (noting that nonlitigation policy should be
accorded more weight than conflicting litigation policy).
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initiatives weigh heavily in favor of recognizing an individual right
under Article 36(1)(b).
Other signatory nations also recognize, at least at the
policymaking level, an individual right to consular notification under
Article 36(1)(b), as evidenced by the amici curiae submissions to
international tribunals and U.S. courts.138 In litigation in which they
had no vested interest, eighteen European nations and eight Central
and South American countries proclaimed that their domestic laws
recognize an individual right under Article 36(1)(b).139
This recognition by other signatories and parties to the treaty
presses the United States also to recognize an individual right.
Without effectuating foreign nationals’ Article 36(1)(b) right, the
United States cannot continue to use the Vienna Convention to
140
further the interests of its citizenry abroad. Reciprocity demands
that the United States recognize an individual right under Article
36(1)(b). This compelling policy consideration, along with the Vienna
Convention’s plain language and its drafting and implementation
histories, indicates that foreign nationals hold what should be a
judicially cognizable right.
III. A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT
The inquiry into whether Article 36(1)(b) confers an individual
right begs the additional question of whether the right, if it exists, is
fundamental in scope. In American jurisprudence, fundamental rights
are those rights that have “a value . . . essential to individual liberty in
our society.”141 They “comprise a subset, or special part, of the

138. See id. at 426 (noting that Argentina, Canada, Mexico, and Paraguay submitted amici
curiae briefs); Advisory Opinion, supra note 13, para. 336 (same).
139. See id. (noting that Argentina, Paraguay, Canada, and Mexico submitted amici curiae
briefs); see also Memorial of Mexico, supra note 8, at 140–41 (noting that eighteen states,
through the European Union and the European Commission, submitted amici curiae briefs in
five death penalty cases in the United States); Advisory Opinion, supra note 13, para. 336
(noting that Mexico, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Paraguay, and the
Dominican Republic submitted amici curiae briefs).
140. See Linda J. Springrose, Note, Strangers in a Strange Land: The Rights of Non-Citizens
Under Article 36 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, 14 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 185, 197
(1999) (noting that the Vienna Convention’s reciprocal nature could imperil the protection of
U.S. citizens if the U.S. government failed to meet its obligations under the Vienna
Convention).
141. JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 11.7, at 433 (6th
ed. 2000).
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142
concept of liberty.” Rights recognized as fundamental include the
right to counsel, the right against self-incrimination, the right to a
speedy trial, the right to confront adverse witnesses, and the right “to
be free from unreasonable searches and seizures and to have
excluded from criminal trials any evidence illegally seized.”143 These
fundamental rights are, of course, anchored in the Bill of Rights.
Nonetheless, not all fundamental rights are enumerated in the Bill of
Rights; they may have “no specific textual basis in the
144
145
Constitution.”
Cases such as Roe v. Wade,
Griswold v.
146
147
Connecticut, Griffin v. Illinois, and, arguably, Lawrence v. Texas148
recognize as fundamental certain rights that are merely implied or
derived from rights enumerated in the Bill of Rights. Therefore, even
in the absence of a perfect fit with the Bill of Rights, a fundamental
right may be recognized under standards articulated by the Supreme
Court:

In determining which rights are fundamental, judges are not left at
large to decide cases in light of their personal and private notions.
Rather, they must look to the “traditions and [collective] conscience
of our people” to determine whether a principle is “so rooted
[there] . . . as to be ranked as fundamental.” The inquiry is whether a
right involved “is of such a character that it cannot be denied
without violating those ‘fundamental principles of liberty and justice
which lie at the base of all our civil and political institutions’ . . . .”
“Liberty” also “gains content from the emanations of . . . specific
[constitutional] guarantees” and “from experience with the
149
requirements of a free society.”

142. Id. § 11.5.
143. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 148 (1968).
144. NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 141, § 11.7.
145. 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (right to abortion).
146. 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (right to marital privacy).
147. 351 U.S. 12 (1956) (right to obtain a court transcript without cost to qualify for
appellate review).
148. 123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003) (right to private sexual conduct). Lawrence v. Texas is arguably a
fundamental rights case. The Court recognized a protected liberty interest under the substantive
due process rubric. The Court merely stopped short of labeling the right to private sexual
conduct as a fundamental right.
149. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 493–94 (Goldberg, J., concurring) (quoting Snyder v.
Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 67 (1932); Poe v.
Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 517 (1961) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (alterations and omissions in
original)).
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The Supreme Court has never considered whether the individual
right conferred by Article 36—which this Part assumes to exist—is
150
fundamental under these standards. The lower federal courts have
concluded that the right is not fundamental in scope,151 reasoning
summarily that the Supremacy Clause places treaty rights on par with
152
statutory rights, not constitutional ones.
But the parity between rights created by treaty and by statute
does not automatically mean that the right to consular notification is
not fundamental. The right may nevertheless be fundamental if it is
153
“deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition” and ‘implicit
154
in the concept of ordered liberty.” Substantive due process could
sweep in the right to consular notification and classify it as a
fundamental right if society’s collective sense of liberty required that
foreign nationals receive greater safeguards than the criminal justice
system provides to American defendants. Whether society’s sense of
due process encompasses the right to consular notification is
unknown, however, because no federal court has ever analyzed the
right to consular notification within the substantive due process
rubric.155
The federal courts’ refusal to perform the substantive due
process inquiry may result from the federal judiciary’s retrenchment
of substantive due process: substantive due process is out vogue.156
Likewise, the literature has used the courts’ curtailment of
substantive due process to dismiss summarily the fundamental rights
argument; legal scholarship has shied away from substantive due
process analysis because of a perception that courts are hesitant to
recognize new rights as fundamental.157

150. See supra Part I.B.1.
151. See supra notes 97–98 and accompanying text.
152. Id.
153. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997) (quoting Moore v. City of East
Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977) (plurality opinion)). Glucksberg outlines the two-step
substantive due process analysis.
154. Id. (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937), overruled by Benton v.
Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969)).
155. See supra Part I.B.
156. See Joshua A. Brook, Note, Federalism and Foreign Affairs: How to Remedy Violations
of the Vienna Convention and Obey the U.S. Constitution, Too, 37 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 573,
595–96 n.108 (2004) (“Some have even argued that consular rights should be deemed
‘fundamental rights’ implied by the Bill of Rights but it is doubtful the Court would accept this
argument given its general retreat from substantive due process.”).
157. See id. (same).
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This reticence is unjustified: the “general retreat from
158
substantive due process” is more perceived than real. In Moore v.
159
City of East Cleveland, the Supreme Court affirmatively denied that
it was retreating from substantive due process;160 Justice Powell
emphasized that the excesses of the Lochner era counseled only
“caution and restraint,” not the “abandonment” of substantive due
process.161 In Washington v. Glucksberg,162 the Court reiterated that it
“must . . . ‘exercise the utmost care whenever [it is] asked to break
163
new ground in this field,’” but at no time has the Court signaled a
complete departure from substantive due process. Undoubtedly, “the
United States Supreme Court still follows the doctrine when
determining unenumerated rights issues.”164
Because substantive due process remains a viable legal doctrine,
it should be applied to the right to consular notification. This Part
explores whether constitutionally protected liberty should include the
right to consular notification. Section A considers the history,
tradition, and practice of consular notification in the United States,
and Section B looks beyond history and tradition to determine if
society’s modern conception of due process includes the right to
consular notification. These Sections together demonstrate that the
right to consular notification is a candidate for constitutional
protection.
A. History, Tradition, and Practice
165
The starting point of a substantive due process analysis is an
examination of the history, tradition, and practice behind the right to
166
consular notification. The point in time from which courts must

158. Id.
159. 431 U.S. 494, 502 (1977).
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
163. Id. at 720 (quoting Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992)).
164. Christopher J. Schmidt, Revitalizing the Quiet Ninth Amendment: Determining
Unenumerated Rights and Eliminating Substantive Due Process, 32 U. BALT. L. REV. 169, 181
(2003).
165. The substantive due process analysis also requires “a ‘careful description’ of the
asserted fundamental liberty interest.” Washington, 521 U.S. at 721 (quoting Reno v. Flores, 507
U.S. 292, 302 (1993)). This prong can be omitted from the analysis here because a careful
description of the right to consular notification is easy—foreign nationals’ right upon arrest to
notification that they may contact their home countries’ consulates for assistance.
166. See supra notes 153 and accompanying text.
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trace this history, tradition, and practice is unclear, although Justice
Scalia characterized it as a demanding inquiry in his Lawrence
167
168
dissent. In Ingraham v. Wright, the majority charted the history of
corporal punishment all the way back to Blackstone and the
American Revolution,169 but, in Lawrence, the majority focused on
170
the history of sodomy laws since 1961. The Supreme Court has not
established a historical benchmark for constitutional protection.
Without a standard for measuring history, tradition, and practice, one
can only make an informed guess about whether the right to consular
notification is so culturally and legally established that the Supreme
Court should incorporate it into due process.
A survey of the history and tradition of consular notification
suggests that the right could meet any of the historical standards that
the Supreme Court previously has employed in substantive due
process inquiries. “[C]onsular relations have been established
between peoples since ancient times,”171 and the State Department
has identified consular notification as a “basic obligation” of
172
conducting consular relations. Because consular notification is such
an integral part of consular relations, one can readily assume that the
history of consular relations and the history of consular notification
are coterminous. This shared history is quite long, as the preamble to
the Vienna Convention acknowledges.173 Even before the Vienna
Convention provided for consular notification, the norms of
customary international law required countries to initiate some sort
of consular communication when they detained foreign nationals,
either by giving foreign nationals the option of contacting their
consulates or by contacting the consulates directly.174 The United
States subscribed to these norms long before it accepted the consular
175
notification requirement by ratifying the Vienna Convention. In

167. See Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2489 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[O]nly
fundamental rights which are ‘deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition’ qualify for
anything other than rational-basis scrutiny . . . .” (quoting Washington, 521 U.S. at 721)).
168. 430 U.S. 651 (1977).
169. Id. at 659–63.
170. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2481.
171. Vienna Convention, supra note 2, pmbl., 21 U.S.T. at 79, 596 U.N.T.S. at 262.
172. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, supra note 4, at 44.
173. Vienna Convention, supra note 2, pmbl., 21 U.S.T. at 79, 596 U.N.T.S. at 262.
174. See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, supra note 4, at 42 (“The [Vienna Convention] to a large
extent codified customary international law . . . .”).
175. See id.
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addition to subscribing to the consular notification norms in
176
customary international law, the State Department negotiated
bilateral consular relations treaties that provided for reciprocal
177
consular notification. These agreements were typically friendship,
commerce, and navigation treaties through which the United States
formalized the consular relations that it had established under
customary international law.178 The United States’ strong historical
commitment to consular notification is best evidenced by mandatory
179
notification agreements (MNA). An MNA is a treaty under which
the United States commits to notify another country’s consulate
whenever it detains one of the other country’s foreign nationals.180
181
The United States had such a treaty with Belgium as early as 1880.
The MNAs’ automatic consular notification provisions attest to the
importance of the assistance that consulates can offer to detained
foreign nationals, and the United States’ historic use of these treaties
attests to the long history of consular notification in this country.
This history strongly suggests that the boundaries of due process
should expand to encompass the right to consular notification. It is a
history at least as compelling as the history underpinning the
Supreme Court’s holding in Lawrence. And the ancient roots of
consular relations are not unlike the archaic origins of corporal
182
punishment. The Supreme Court is willing to grant constitutional
183
protection to rights deeply embedded in this nation’s history.
Ultimately, only the Supreme Court can determine what constitutes
embedment, but the practice of notifying foreign nationals about
consular assistance or contacting the consulate directly extends
throughout United States history to the earliest interactions among
the peoples of sovereign states. This history at least merits

176. Id.
177. Id.
178. U.S. Dep’t of State, Founding of the Department of State, 1789, at
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/nr/14316.htm (last visited Jan. 30, 2005) (on file with the Duke
Law Journal).
179. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, supra note 4, at 43.
180. The International Justice Project, Foreign Nationals: Bilateral Mandatory Notification
Treaties, at www.internationaljusticeproject.org/nationals_bil.cfm (last visited Feb. 1, 2005) (on
file with the Duke Law Journal).
181. Id.
182. See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 659–63 (1977) (reviewing the history of corporal
punishment).
183. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 488 (Goldberg, J., concurring) (1965)
(noting that the Framers recognized rights beyond those specified in the Bill of Rights).
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consideration by the federal courts, which should recognize the right
as a possible fundamental right and conduct a thorough substantive
due process analysis.
B. Modern Conceptions of Liberty
Analyzing the history, tradition, and practice that underlie a right
184
is only the first prong of the substantive due process analysis.
“History and tradition are the starting point but not in all cases the
185
ending point of the substantive due process inquiry.” Therefore, the
substantive due process analysis also requires consideration of
society’s modern conceptions of due process—what rights should now
be included in the constitutional conception of liberty.186 Before the
right to consular notification can qualify as fundamental, its place in
society’s modern vision of due process must be examined. The
Supreme Court alternatively has described this second prong of the
substantive due process inquiry as a determination of whether the
right is so “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty”187 that “neither
liberty nor justice would exist if [it was] sacrificed,”188 or whether it “is
of such a character that it cannot be denied without violating those
‘fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of
all our civil and political institutions.’”189 These are iterations of the
same basic question: Must this right be recognized as fundamental to
maintain the American conception of constitutional freedom?
This question may be answered affirmatively even if the right
190
can be recognized as fundamental only by implication.
The Supreme Court has recognized fundamental rights—such as the
right to privacy191 and the right to raise one’s child as one sees

184. See Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2480 (2003) (noting that history and tradition
should be the starting, but not the ending, point (citing County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S.
833, 857 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring))).
185. Id. (quoting County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 857 (1998) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring)).
186. See id. at 571–72 (“[W]e think that our laws and traditions in the past half century are
of most relevance here.”).
187. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937), overruled by Benton v. Maryland, 395
U.S. 784 (1969).
188. Id. at 326.
189. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 493 (Goldberg, J., concurring) (quoting Powell
v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 67 (1932) (quoting Hebert v. Louisiana, 272 U.S. 312, 316 (1926))).
190. See id. at 482–83 (“Without those peripheral rights the specific rights would be less
secure.”).
191. See id. (recognizing the right to privacy).
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192
193
fit —that are only derivative of express constitutional protections;
fundamental rights need not be explicitly guaranteed by the Bill of
194
Rights.
Along these lines, courts could derive a fundamental right to
195
consular notification from the Bill of Rights. Arguably, notions of
privacy and autonomy should provide constitutional protection to the
right to consular notification even though this right is not expressly
within the Constitution’s ambit. This argument depends on the
disadvantages faced by foreign nationals in the American criminal
justice system196 and on the idea that peripheral constitutional rights
must be recognized to make enumerated constitutional rights more
197
secure. Griswold and Roe lend precedential support—a protectable
right to privacy must exist in a free society.
But reliance on the right-to-privacy cases may be misplaced.
These cases recognize a right to privacy rooted in individual liberty
and autonomy—a right that the Supreme Court has been careful to
contain.198 This right, which has had little generative effect in recent
years,199 may be a shaky constitutional basis for implying a right to
consular notification. The relationship between a right to consular
notification and notions of autonomy and liberty is too attenuated:
although the right to consular notification does implicate foreign
nationals’ autonomy, deprivations of the right to consular notification
restrain foreign nationals’ physical liberty more than their freedom of
choice. Furthermore, Justice Scalia suggested in his Lawrence dissent
that Glucksberg has eroded the Griswold line of cases.200
A better argument would rely on “emanations [from] specific
201
202
[constitutional] guarantees,” namely, the Sixth Amendment. The

192. See Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (recognizing parents’ right to raise
their children as they see fit).
193. See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 483–84 (explaining the penumbras of guaranteed rights).
194. See id. (explaining how “various guarantees create zones of privacy” beyond specific
Bill of Rights provisions).
195. See Springrose, supra note 140, at 199–203.
196. See infra notes 209–218 and accompanying text.
197. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 482–83.
198. See Washington v. Glucksburg, 521 U.S. 702, 723–28 (1997) (declining to derive from
the right to privacy a right to commit suicide or to assist another to commit suicide).
199. Id.
200. See supra note 167 and accompanying text.
201. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 517 (1961) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
202. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
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Supreme Court has suggested in criminal procedure cases that rights
can be implied from the existing right to counsel under the Palko v.
203
Connecticut standard: rights are fundamental if they are “implicit in
the concept of ordered liberty,”204 such that “neither liberty nor justice
would exist if they were sacrificed.”205 In Griffin, the Court noted that
the Constitution does not mention any right to a free transcript for
appellate review, but the Court recognized the right as fundamental,
stating, “[O]ur own constitutional guaranties . . . allow no invidious
discriminations between persons and different groups of
persons. . . [A]ll people charged with crime must, so far as the law is
concerned, ‘stand on an equality before the bar of justice in every
206
American court.’” A Palko argument was also made by the
dissenters in Betts v. Brady,207 who rightly argued that “[a] practice
cannot be reconciled with ‘common and fundamental ideas of fairness
and right,’ which subjects innocent men to increased dangers of
conviction merely because of their poverty.”208
This argument may be equally applicable in the cases of foreign
nationals. To use the language of the Betts dissenters, “[a] . . . practice
[may not be reconcilable] with ‘common and fundamental ideas of
fairness and right,’ which subjects innocent men to increased dangers
209
of conviction merely because of their” alienage. Like indigents,
foreign nationals may face “increased dangers of conviction”210
211
because of a cultural gap. This cultural gap, characterized by
language differences and an alien criminal justice system, may
prevent foreign nationals from fully understanding their legal rights,
when arresting authorities explain their legal rights to them.212 For
instance, foreign nationals, unfamiliar with the American adversary
system, may not appreciate that they are “not required to make any
203. 302 U.S. 319 (1937), overruled by Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969).
204. Id. at 325.
205. Id. at 326.
206. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 17 (1956) (quoting Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227,
241 (1940)).
207. 316 U.S. 455 (1942), overruled by Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
208. Id. at 476 (Black, J., dissenting) (quoting the majority opinion at 473).
209. Id. (Black, J., dissenting) (quoting the majority opinion at 473).
210. Id. (Black, J., dissenting).
211. See Springrose, supra note 140, at 195–96 (explaining that cultural differences
sometimes lead foreign nationals unwittingly to jeopardize their own defenses).
212. See John Cary Sims & Linda E. Carter, Representing Foreign Nationals: Emerging
Importance of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations as a Defense Tool, THE CHAMPION,
Sept.–Oct. 1998, at 30.
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213
statement to the police or prosecutors” or that they cannot be
214
compelled to testify. Instead, foreign nationals may follow practices
from their home countries, which are incompatible with the United
States’ adversary system. The Paraguayan national in Breard, for
example, confessed to rape and murder, in spite of his Fifth
Amendment rights, because the courts of his home country offered
leniency for confessions.215
For several reasons, the American right to counsel cannot always
correct such misunderstandings of the legal system. First, many
foreign nationals may not know that they have a right to an attorney.
Furthermore, even if foreign nationals have attorneys appointed for
them, the attorneys may not be able to bridge the cultural gap on
their own. Foreign nationals simply may not trust their appointed
216
attorneys enough to cooperate in an effective defense. This scenario
is especially likely when foreign nationals do not understand the
attorney-client privilege.217 Similarly, the other protections of criminal
due process may fail to bridge the cultural gap because the safeguards
218
themselves are undermined by cultural differences. Consequently,
only “[a]n interested consul can provide the bridge”219 to close the
cultural gap effectively. Consular assistance is needed to effectuate
due process for foreign nationals and to place them on par with other
criminal defendants. Only consular assistance will ward off the
increased dangers of conviction faced by foreign nationals, which
qualifies the right to consular notification for fundamental status
under the Palko-Betts analysis.220 The right to consular notification
should be recognized as fundamental because allowing foreign
nationals to stand trial without consular assistance to help them
overcome their cultural disadvantages does not square with society’s
221
common and fundamental ideas of fairness and right.

213. Id.
214. Id.
215. See Springrose, supra note 140, at 195–96 (explaining the impact of culture on the
events of Breard).
216. Sims & Carter, supra note 212.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. See supra notes 201–19 and accompanying text.
221. Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 476 (1942) (Black, J., dissenting) (quoting the majority
opinion at 473), overruled by Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
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The Palko-Betts analysis provides a strong constitutional basis
for the right to consular notification. The right could be implied from
a specific constitutional provision—the Sixth Amendment—which
gives it the strength of textual support. Furthermore, there is a strong
connection between the Sixth Amendment and the right to consular
notification because they are both assurances of fairness in the
criminal justice system. Given the existence of a textual basis from
which to imply a fundamental right to consular notification, there is
no need to resort to the individual autonomy argument,222 which is not
as strong as a textual implication argument based directly on the Sixth
Amendment.
What is most significant for the purposes of this Note is that
there exist two plausible arguments for implying a fundamental right
to consular notification. The mere existence and viability of these
arguments suggest that the right to consular notification is a
contender for fundamental status. Whether it deserves constitutional
protection should be determined through a comprehensive
substantive due process analysis.
CONCLUSION
Article 36(1)(b) most likely grants individual foreign nationals a
right to notification that their consuls may assist them. Even though
treaties do not generally create individual rights, profuse evidence
suggests that the Vienna Convention is an exception to this general
rule. As a self-executing treaty, the Vienna Convention is capable of
granting individual rights, and the treaty’s language and drafting
history indicate that it does so. The treaty explicitly references an
individual, and the drafting history indicates that the drafters
intended to vest an individual right in foreign nationals. The strength
of this evidence should lead to a uniform recognition of an individual
right by the American courts and the criminal justice system.
Moreover, the judicial system should consider recognizing the
individual right as a fundamental right. Fundamental rights can be
derivative of or implied from enumerated constitutional protections if
the rights are sufficiently underpinned by history, tradition, and
practice and conform to society’s modern conceptions of due process.
Strong historical evidence suggests that consular notification could
meet any historical benchmark established for fundamental rights.

222.

See supra notes 195–200 and accompanying text.

WHITESELL FINAL.DOC

6/6/2005 10:38 AM

2004] VIENNA CONVENTION AND INDIVIDUAL DUE PROCESS

619

Consular notification is consistent with society’s modern conceptions
of liberty because it is a fairness guarantee in the criminal justice
system. Given that Article 36(1)(b) was intended to protect foreign
nationals in alien criminal justice systems and that the concept of
consular notification extends throughout American history, the right
in Article 36(1)(b) should at least merit recognition as a potential
fundamental right, and violations of this right should prompt an
exacting substantive due process inquiry. Foreign nationals facing
convictions and punishments in the United States deserve a careful
consideration of the right that the Vienna Convention arguably gives.

